The Origins of Northern Ireland

By Cormac Moore

The exclusion of Ulster from any Irish home rule settlement became the overriding issue of the third home rule bill introduced in 1912. Irish Unionist leader Edward Carson initially ‘hoped to use Ulster Unionist resistance to prevent home rule coming into effect in any part of Ireland’. Partition of Ulster, or parts of it, emerged as an option in the decade from 1912. There was nothing predestined, though, about the settlements of 1920-1 that eventually materialised.

Ulster unionists armed themselves and threatened to establish a provisional government in Ulster if home rule was brought into Ireland. Their open flouting of the law was supported by the British Conservative Party, now re-named the Unionist Party and led from 1912 to 1923 by Andrew Bonar Law. The Irish Party also accused the Liberal government of lukewarm support for home rule. Senior Liberal figures such as David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill were early advocates of some form of exclusion for Ulster from home rule. When British prime minister Herbert Asquith introduced the third home rule bill to the House of Commons on 11 April 1912, no special provision was made for Ulster though. Although it looked like home rule for the whole island was close at hand, the House of Lords still had a veto for two years, meaning home rule could not be enacted until 1914 at the earliest. The veto gave unionists ample time to spoil the bill, and knowing the Liberal Party’s dilemma over Ulster, it soon became apparent that the British government would offer special treatment to Ulster.

By late 1913, as civil war in Ireland was threatened with unionists and nationalists forming military groups, great pressure was put on the Irish Parliamentary Party leader John Redmond to compromise on Ulster. The Irish Party declared itself open to the concept of the home rule of Ulster within the home rule of Ireland. Carson considered this as totally unacceptable. In March 1914, Redmond agreed to a form of temporary exclusion, whereby individual Ulster counties could opt for exclusion for a period of six years, after which they would automatically come under the jurisdiction of the Irish Parliament. Carson threatened forceful resistance unless exclusion was permanent. He insisted unionists did not want ‘a stay of execution for six years.’

The Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913. (Image: Library of Congress)

Civil war in Ireland was averted by another war, the start of the First World War, according to Asquith a case of, ‘cutting off one’s head to get rid of a headache’. Once the war started, the government placed home rule on the statute book with two important provisos: home rule would not come into operation until the end of the war and special provision must be made for ‘Protestant Ulster’.

After the Easter Rising, Asquith tasked Lloyd George in the summer of 1916 with initiating negotiations to implement the Home Rule Act ‘at the earliest practicable moment’. Lloyd George negotiated separately with Redmond and Carson, telling the former the exclusion of six counties of Ulster would be temporary, to the latter their exclusion would be permanent. Once Lloyd George’s duplicity was revealed and he informed Redmond that the exclusion of six counties of Ulster would be permanent, Redmond, outmanoeuvred again, rejected the proposals. The 1916 attempts were yet another blow for Redmond and the Irish Party.

The December 1918 General Election, the first since December 1910, was one of the most decisive in Irish history. Sinn Féin obliterated the Irish Party by winning 73 of the 105 seats available in Ireland. The Irish Party won just six seats. Sinn Féin decided to abstain from taking its seats in Westminster, meaning there would be just a handful of Irish nationalist MPs left in the House of Commons. The election was also a spectacular success for Ulster unionists. Of the 37 seats available in the province of Ulster, unionists won 22. In the six counties that would form Northern Ireland, the unionists won 22 of the 29 available.

Ulster unionists were bolstered by the 1918 electoral success of their allies in Britain, the Tories, too. Lloyd George’s national coalition was easily re-elected. Most of the seats in the coalition were won by the Conservatives, though, 339 to 136 seats for Lloyd George’s Coalition Liberals. With the Conservatives and unionists winning the vast majority of the seats and with no strong nationalist voice remaining in Westminster, Tory stranglehold on Irish policy tightened immeasurably.

The genesis of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 came in the latter half of 1919 when Lloyd George set up a committee chaired by Walter Long, a staunch unionist and rabid anti-Sinn Féin cabinet member, to draft a home rule bill. Unsurprisingly, the make-up of Long’s committee was unionist in outlook. There was no nationalist representation whatsoever, nor were nationalists even consulted. The leading Ulster unionist James Craig and his associates were the only Irishmen consulted during the drafting of the bill. The committee decided to create distinct legislatures for Ulster and the southern provinces linked by a common council, comprising representatives from both, a Council of Ireland. This was the first time that the British government proposed a separate parliament for Ulster.

By offering nationalists far less than they demanded and Ulster unionists far more than they had ever sought, the government of Ireland bill was an attempt to solve the Ulster question, not the Irish question.

The British government was interested only in securing the support of Ulster unionists. Initially, there were many objections from Ulster unionists, particularly with the area to be included in the Ulster parliament. Ulster unionists sought six counties, not the nine counties of Ulster offered by the British government, as this was the maximum area they felt they could dominate without being ‘outbred’ by Catholics. The decision of the Ulster Unionist Council was deeply unpopular amongst the 70,000 Protestants of counties Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan who were sacrificed to the southern administration. Westminster MP Thomas Moles explained that the three counties had to be abandoned in order to save the six counties, ‘In a sinking ship, with life-boats sufficient for only two-thirds of the ship’s company, were all to condemn themselves to death because all could not be saved?’

As the government of Ireland bill was making its way through parliament, the British Government was waging a war with Sinn Féin and its military wing, the Irish Volunteers (renamed the Irish Republican Army (IRA)). On top of having its own parliament, Dáil Éireann, Sinn Féin also set up a counter-state with its own legal system, police force and local government. That the Government of Ireland Act 1920 came into law as Britain was at open war with Sinn Féin, who was supported by a considerable majority on the island, shows the total air of unreality that surrounded the act.

By 1920, political violence, ongoing since 1919 in the south and the west of Ireland had started to reach Ulster. In July, Catholics and Protestant socialists (so-called ‘rotten prods’) were expelled by employees from the Belfast shipyards and other employers. The unrest travelled from the workplace to the streets of Belfast, resulting in 19 dead and many more wounded or homeless within five days. As the city was besieged by sectarian violence, the government of Ireland bill was still manoeuvring its way through the House of Commons. The leading nationalist remaining in Westminster, Belfast West MP Joseph Devlin summed up the incredulity felt by many nationalists by accusing the government of not putting ‘a single clause…to safeguard the interests of our people’.

Drawing showing the violence on Marrowbone Lane in Belfast in september 1920. (Image: Illustrated London News, 9 October 1920)

Instead of listening to Devlin or the people he represented, the British government took two steps in late 1920, on the advice of James Craig, that showed the only voices being listened to in Ireland were those of Ulster unionists. Before the government of Ireland bill even became law in December 1920, Craig’s proposals to commission an official loyalist police force, the Specials, just for the area that would become Northern Ireland, as well as the creation of the post of Assistant Under-Secretary for the same area, were granted.

The expulsions of workers and the sectarian violence in the north saw Sinn Féin make one of its first decisions directly relating to the north, it started a boycott. Many saw it as an anti-partitionist move, a way to show that Northern Ireland could not survive without the rest of Ireland. Despite opposition from Sinn Féin members such as Ernest Blythe and Countess Constance Markievicz claiming it would increase the likelihood of partition, the Dáil and its cabinet approved the instigation of the boycott. It was in this atmosphere of war, sectarian violence and boycotts that the government of Ireland bill became an act on 23 December 1920.

The act came into effect on 3 May 1921. Three weeks later, the election was held for the northern parliament. Although nationalists vehemently opposed the Government of Ireland Act 1920, they still contested the election for the northern parliament. Sinn Féin won six seats, the United Irish League Party (an iteration of the Irish Party) also won six, unionists winning the other 40. All nationalists abstained from taking their seats in the new Northern Ireland parliament, granting unionists a monopoly on proceedings. For the Southern Ireland parliament, not one seat was contested. Sinn Féin secured 124 seats, all of them except for the four seats in Dublin University. Sinn Féin used the occasion to elect a second Dáil. Outside of Northern Ireland, the Government of Ireland Act 1920 was ignored.

Notwithstanding the fanfare surrounding the occasion of the official opening of the northern parliament by King George V in June 1921, violence and the threat of violence permeated the new jurisdiction. Whilst hostilities eased in the south after the Truce of 11 July, the birth of Northern Ireland witnessed another wave of intense sectarian violence engulfing Belfast between June and August. It was a contested entity from the moment of its inception, ignored by the Catholic community which comprised one third of the population.

Northern Ireland had come into existence, but it needed to be equipped with government services. The transfer of services was stalled due to only one of the Irish jurisdictions being operational under the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The northern government had no control over policing or over its laws. One of the main reasons for the delay in the transferring of services was the transformed situation in Ireland by the Truce. This led to a change of priority on the Irish question for the British government.

In preceding years, Sinn Féin leaders tended to over-emphasise the blame attributed to Britain for causing partition and downplay the real hostility of Ulster unionists to being governed by a Dublin parliament. There seemed a genuine, one that was wholly naïve, belief that if Britain withdrew from Ireland, Ulster unionists would be open to a united Ireland. The Sinn Féin leader Éamon de Valera felt that the troubles in Ulster were ‘due to British guile and nothing else’. He also described Ulster as a ‘foreign garrison’, claiming Ulster unionists were ‘not Irish people’, if they rejected Sinn Féin solutions ‘they would have to go under’. De Valera modified his views, though, ruling out the use of force against Ulster unionists by 1921.

This more conciliatory approach was evident with de Valera’s willingness to meet with Craig in May 1921. Craig wanted an agreement on the border, de Valera an agreement on Irish unity, both as unrealistic as the other. Although no agreement was reached, they both expressed an openness to meet again, which never happened. The meeting also showed that Craig was open to negotiating with Sinn Féin, demonstrating that flexibility existed within Ulster unionism and Sinn Féin.

Craig was not involved in the talks between de Valera and Lloyd George following the Truce in July, stating ‘I’m going to sit on Ulster like a rock’. On 18 July, however, Lloyd George put forward suggestions to Craig as to how he ‘might accommodate de Valera’s requirement of Irish unity with local autonomy for the north devolved from Dublin’. Craig emphatically rejected them. Even though Lloyd George backed down, it was clear that Northern Ireland’s status was not secure.

The leaders of the north and south: James Craig and Éamon de Valera. (Images: National Portrait Gallery UK and Library of Congress)

During the Treaty negotiations between Sinn Féin and the British government from October to December 1921, the two primary issues discussed were Ulster and the crown. The Irish were successful in re-opening the Ulster Question, rekindling matters that Ulster unionists thought were settled. Lloyd George admitted they had a weaker case on Ulster, stating ‘while British soldiers might die for the throne and empire, I do not know who will die for Tyrone and Fermanagh’. Once the Irish delegation stated that their allegiance to crown and empire was contingent on Ireland’s ‘essential unity’, Lloyd George and others within the British government appeared open to changing Northern Ireland’s status if Sinn Féin would accept allegiance to the crown. Lloyd George unsuccessfully tried to pressure Craig to agree to accepting an all-Ireland parliament, stating that ‘two dominions in Ireland was impractical and indefensible’.

Craig refused to concede any ground to Lloyd George and instead the British prime minister agreed to transfer services to Northern Ireland without the existence of a government in the south. The Irish delegation were aware that the northern jurisdiction was not fully functioning when the conference began in October. Services being withheld by the British demonstrated that partition could be negotiable, but they appeared unaware on how to use this to their advantage. The significance of services being transferred to the north seemed lost on almost all back in Dublin too.

With the avenue of reaching a settlement by pressurising Craig now closed, Lloyd George looked to squeeze the Sinn Féin delegation instead. His secretary, Tom Jones, dangled the idea of a Boundary Commission to Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, Sinn Féin’s lead negotiators. Griffith believed there would be benefits to it, the Boundary Commission ‘would give us most of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and part of Armagh, Down, etc.’ This formed the basis of Article 12, the Anglo-Irish Treaty’s main provision relating to Ulster. It stipulated that if Northern Ireland opted not to join the Irish Free State, a Boundary Commission would determine the border ‘in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions’. Central to the problem with the article was its ambiguity. No plebiscite was asked for and the clause was open to a number of different interpretations. Sinn Féin blundered greatly in agreeing to such a vague and ill-defined clause.

Ulster unionists were vehemently opposed to the Boundary Commission. It re-opened uncertainty and put Northern Ireland’s future in doubt, at least significant parts of it, yet again. Nationalist leaders in the six and 26 counties were overly optimistic, as it would transpire, on the outcomes that would be achieved from this Boundary Commission, believing many areas in Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Irish Free State. The optimism over the Boundary Commission, in many ways, explains the fraction of time devoted to partition during the acrimonious Dáil debates over the Treaty. Even de Valera’s alternative proposal to the Treaty, Document No. 2, originally included the same clauses on the north as the Treaty. Many nationalists along the border believed their transfer to the Irish Free State was imminent. They were lulled into a false sense of security, believing they could continue to ignore the northern jurisdiction and its institutions.

The prospect in 1921 of some levels of unionist cooperation with nationalism evaporated, replaced by a siege mentality to protect the north’s interests from the south and from those disloyal elements within its territory. Many nationalist-controlled local authorities within Northern Ireland chose a policy of non-recognition of the new jurisdiction. Both Tyrone and Fermanagh county councils declared allegiance to the Dáil on 28 November. The northern government suspended them both, with the police taking over the headquarters in Omagh and Enniskillen and impounding their records. In total, 21 nationalist-controlled authorities, including those of Newry, Armagh, Strabane, Cookstown, Downpatrick, Magherafelt and Keady, were suspended by April 1922.

The provisional government, led by Michael Collins, had the difficult task of trying to prevent a civil war within its own jurisdiction and react to conflict in the northern jurisdiction almost from the very moment of its inception. Collins pursued a dangerous duplicitous path of pursuing peace through pacts with James Craig in January and March of 1922 on the one hand, and sanctioning a policy of military activity along and across the border on the other.

The pacts with Craig were in many ways a public front for Collins who by his other actions, sought to destabilise the northern jurisdiction. On top of arming the IRA for engagements in the north, Collins led a policy of non-recognition of the six counties, which caused deep frustration for the British and Northern Irish governments. One of the primary policies of non-recognition involved the payment of salaries of teachers based in Northern Ireland who refused to recognise the northern government’s ministry of education. The provisional government was also extremely tardy in transferring civil service personnel and files to Belfast.

Once Collins was killed in August 1922, a new policy prevailed to recognise the northern government and to discontinue the obstructionist policies. Another step by the Free State government in March 1923 had arguably the biggest impact in cementing partition, the imposition of customs duties on imported goods. The creation of a customs barrier was key in translating partition into a reality, by impacting the day-to-day lives of people more than anything else.
The Boundary Commission met for the first time in November 1924. The work completed by the commission was not revealed for decades due to a leaking of the recommendations by the pro-unionist newspaper the Morning Post in November 1925. Much to the surprise of many nationalists, no large-scale transfers were on offer. In fact, parts of East Donegal were to be transferred to the north. The leak caused outrage in Dublin. Realising the danger, the crisis posed to the government, the president of the Free State executive council W.T. Cosgrave dashed over to London to have the report shelved, resulting in the border remaining as it was, as it is to the present day.

Prof. Alvin Jackson, University of Edinburgh, describes the way in which Sir Edward Carson's attitude towards partition changed between 1910 and 1918

The path to partition was long, uncertain and meandering. The narrative of partition being an inevitable and pre-determined ‘solution’ between Ulster unionists and Irish nationalists is too simplistic. The decade from 1912 saw many twists and turns that brought about partition. That decade counted for a great deal. Certainty realistically only arrived in 1925 with the decision to retain the status quo after the Boundary Commission debacle.

There was also more conflict internally within unionism and nationalism, and more flexibility outside of their different factions. Many unionists sought reasonable cooperation with nationalists. Sinn Féin was not as dogmatic as some suggest and compromised on many of its key principles, including foregoing its demand for a republic. The British government showed it was flexible too, open to Northern Ireland being subservient to a Dublin parliament, even after Northern Ireland was established. From looking at events as they happened at the time, it is clear that the type of partition that eventually transpired was not inevitable nor pre-determined.

Cormac Moore’s latest book Birth of the Border: The Impact of Partition in Ireland, is published by Irish Academic Press. The book can be purchased online here.